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May 1957: Rome Treaty signed; it provides for the establish-
ment of a Monetary Committee to foster monetary cooperation,
and the granting of mutual assistance to countries in balance-of-
payments difficulties. The member states undertake to treat their
economic and monetary policies as "matters of common interest.
February 1960: Six set up Short-term Economic Policy
Committee to improve coordination procedures.
October 1962: Commission calls for coordination of member
states' monetary policies, in particular the creation of consulta-
tion procedures, the establishment of a common positi9n on
external monetary relations, and the negotiation of an agreement
on mutual aid for member countries in balance-of-payments
difficulties.
April 1964: Six set up Medium-term Economic Policy Com-
mittee to improve coordination of medium-term economic
policies.
May 1964: Six set up Committee of Central Bank Governors
to strengthen monetary cooperation, and Budget Policy Commit-
tee to compare member countries' budget policies.
February 1968: The Commission suggests that the following
goals be studied: fixed currency parities, with exceptions by
common accord only, and elimination of day-to-day currency
fluctuations in transactions between the member states; estab-
lishment of mutual-aid machinery; the definition of a European
unit of account.
July 1968: France s partners grant her mutual monetary aid.
Commission authorizes France to restrict imports and reimpose
exchange control temporarily.
September 1968: Finance Ministers of the Six authorize the
Monetary Committee and the Committee of Central Bank
Governors to study closer monetary relations in the Community.
December 1968: Monetary disturbances in November
especially speculation against the French franc, lead the Com-
mission to announce that it will propose the setting up of
monetary cooperation machinery.
December 1968: Council in broad agreement on need for
greater convergence of economic policies.
February 1969: Commission memorandum calls for coordina-
tion of short- and medium-term economic policies, and the setting
up of machinery for monetary cooperation.
July 1969: Council of Ministers agrees on closer cooperation
on short-term economic policies and on the principle of a
Community system of short-term monetary support. It decides to
start thorough discussion of measures to strengthen the coordina-
tion of medium-term economic policies, and to study a system of
medium-term financial aid.
August 1969: France devalues the franc.
September 1969: Germany "floats" the mark.
October 1969: Germany revalues the mark.
October 1969: IMF articles of agreement changed so that
certain important decisions require 85 per cent majority. This
enables the Six to veto proposals if they adopt a common pm!ition,
December 1969: Heads of state or government of the Six,
meeting at The Hague, reaffirm their readiness to promote the!
Community s development into an economic union. They agree
to work out a plan for the creation by stages of an economic and
monetary union, and to consider the setting up of a European
Reserve Fund as the consequence of harmonized economic
policies.
December 1969: Commission memorandum suggests that
medium-term policy harmonization would be more effective if the
guidelines were expressed in figures.
January 1970: Council of Ministers agrees to the principle of
a joint definition of medium-term indicators and calls for a
medium-term economic policy programme. This should contain
definitive economic guideposts for 1970-75 and an inventory of
the main structural reforms to be accomplished at national and
Community levels. Ministers also approve a short-term monetary
aid agreement.
February 1970: Community central banks formally activate a
$2-billion short-term mutual monetary aid system.
March 1970: Commission publishes three-stage plan for
achieving a monetary and economic union by 1980.
March 1970: Finance Ministers set up group of experts under
Luxembourg s Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Pierre
Werner, to consider plans for economic and monetary union
submitted by the Commission, Belgium, Germany and Luxem-
bourg, and to report on ways of achieving such a union.
June 1970: Council of Ministers eudorse Werner group s con-
clusion, in its preliminary report, that \U1 economic and monetary
union "appears to be attainable in the course of the present
decade, provided it receives the permanent political support of
the governments.
June 1970: Commission proposes the creation of a $2 billion
medium-term mutual monetary-aid system.
July 1970: Council decides to introduce medium-term
monetary-aid machinery.
October 1970: Werner group presents its final report to
Council and Commission on attainment of economic and
monetary union in Community by stages.
October 1970: Commission proposes that Council express its
political will to achieve economic and monetary union, and agree
on action programme for 1971- , starting with closer coordina-
tion of short-term economic policies and cooperation between
member states' central banks.
February 1971: Council unanimously agrees to phased
programme for achieving economic and monetary union, and
. decides in particular to:
I . narro\v'exchange-rate margins between member countries
currencies;
2. create $2 000 million medium-term reserves pool to support
member states suffering from fundamental balance-of-payments 
difficulties;
3. coordinate short- and medium-term economic and budgetary
policies with regular meetings between finance ministers and
central1;Jank governor&,March 1971:  Council formally adopts: resolution agreed in
February 1971 on establishment by stages of an economic and
monetary union; and three decisions agreed on in February 1971
on increased coordination of short-term economic policies,
strengthened cooperation between central banks, and establish-
ment of a mechanism for medium-term financial aid.
May 1971  : Council authorizes temporary widening of exchange
rates. Germany floats mark; the Netherlands float guilder.
July 1971:  Commission proposes controls on short-term
capital movements and foreign borrowing by residents; and
restrictions on money-market operations by non-residents.
July 1971  : Franco-German talks on monetary reform.
August 1971:  President Nixon announces measures to
combat inflation and deal with US balance of payments: suspends
dollar convertibility and introduces 10 per cent surcharge on
imports.
August  1971: Council of Ministers decides:
1. Reform of the international monetary system is necessary;
2, Member countries should be free to adopt either a single- or
two-tier foreign exchange market;
3. The Central Bank Governors' Committee and the Monetary
Committee should submit proposals on intervention instruments
and techniques that would contribute towards a progressive
narrowing of the fluctuation margins between EEC currencies.
August 1971:  Italy floats lira; Benelux countries float their
currencies; France adopts two-tier commercial and financial
foreign-exchange market.
September  1971 : Council of Ministers agrees on need for
fixed but adjustable exchange rate parities, realignment of
exchange rates of major currencies, and lifting of US surcharge.
December 1971:  International realignment of currencies
agreed, including devaluation of dollar against gold. US abolishes
10 per cent surcharge.
January 1972:  Commission proposes that member states
currencies fluctuate by no more than 2 per cent against one
another; earlier Commission proposals to control speculative
capital movements be implemented; a European monetary
cooperation fund be created.
March 1972:  Member states relaunch monetary union; they
agree to set up group to coordinate short-term economic policy
and to narrow exchange rate fluctuations to 2'25 per cent.
April 1972: Member states' and acceding states ' central banks
begin to limit exchange rate fluctuations between their currencies
to 2'25 per cent.Introduction
The European Community decided in February 1971 to
enter the first stage of a process which should result in a
complete economic and monetary union by the end of 1980.
This is one of the most important and ambitious decisions
taken since Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands signed the Rome Treaty setting up the
Common Marketin 1957.
The Six are aware of the profound political significance 
for Europe and the world - which achievement of economic
and monetary union would have for the Community and
the member states. They have expressed the wish to make
the undertaking irreversible.
Member states hope that in setting up such a union over
the next ten years, they will help to ensure satisfactory
growth, full employment and stability in the Community;
to remedy structural and regional imbalances; and to
strengthen the Community s contribution to international
economic and monetary cooperation.
Progress towards full economic union would mean that
each member country s monetary and fiscal policies would
increasingly be decided at Community instead of at national
level. Sales and company taxes and excise duties throughout
the Community would be harmonized. For the first time
there would be a genuinely integrated Community capital
market. After the transition process, exchange rates between
Community currencies would not be changed again. As
there would be complete freedom to change one currency
for another, and as exchange rates would be rigid, the
Italian lira would be just as useful a currency as German
marks in Germany, Dutch guilders just as useful a currency
as French francs in France, and so on.
But the implications are not simply economic. If decisions
were to be made at Community level, then new institutions
might have to be created or the powers of existing institu-
tions extended, so that joint policies could be decided and
carried out. Community institutions would need to be
subject to democratic control, so that the European
Parliament would have to be strengthened. Increasing
economic and monetary integration of Europe could lead
to developing political integration, a trend which would
accord with the concepts of those who founded the present
Community.
It was the " summit" conference of the six Community
states, held in December 1969 at The Hague, which gave
the impetus for a full monetary union. Member countries
were very conscious that, with the final phase of the
Common Market about to begin, the Community had
reached a turning-point in its history. By entering this final
phase, the Community was not only affirming the irreversible
nature of its previous progress and decisions, but also
preparing the way for a politically united Europe.
First step
Early in 1971 the Six took the first step to implement
economic and monetary union by the end of 1980. At a
session of the Council of Ministers on February 8- , 1971
they agreed that the first phase in the process of complete
monetary integration should run from January 1, 1971, to .
December 31 1973. By the end of the last phase there could
be a single currency for the whole Community.
The Six declared that during the first stage they intended
to:
.. narrow the exchange-rate margins between their
currencies;
. set up a $2 000 million medium-term reserves pool to
support member states suffering from fundamental balance-
of-payment difficulties (over and above the $2 000 million
short-term reserves pool set up for similar purposes in
February 1970);
. coordinate short- and medium-term economic and
budgetary policies;
. hold regular meetings of their finance ministers and
central-bank governors.
Before the end of 1973 the member states plan to take
the major political decisions about the ultimate nature of
the union, especially the extent to which Community
institutions, responsible to a European Parliament, would
have to be created and take over some of the decision-
making which is at present carried out by individual member
countries. Without these, a monetary union would be
meaningless.
By the end of 1973 the Council has undertaken to decide
whether any transfer of power to the Community is advis- 
able. The short- and medium-term stabilization pools, and
the other measures agreed will, however, continue to
operate until end-1975; if the member states have not agreed
by then on the Community s additional economic powers
member states could have recourse to an "escape clause
permitting them to pull out of the pool. The clause is
seen as a powerful incentive to the member states to agree
before 1976 to implement fully a monetary union.
The Council's agreement in principle of February 1971
was formally adopted on March 22, 1971.
The plan for economic union suffered a setback in May
1971, following excessive inflows of capital into certain
Community countries. Despite the incompatibility under
normal conditions of floating exchange rates with the
smooth functioning of the Community s single market for
all goods, the Council of Ministers agreed that the countries
affected might, for a limited period, widen fluctuation
margins of the exchange rates of their currencies in relation
to existing parities.
Floating currencies
As a result, Germany and the Netherlands floated their
currencies theiFcentral banks ceased to support the official
rate  vis-it-vis  the dollar. The Six postponed the first concrete
move to monetary union: the reduction scheduled for.
June 15, 1971, of the margins in which the Community'
currencies fluctuated against each other, from 0,75 per cent
to 0,60 per cent either side of par.
Following President Nixon s decision of August 15, 1971,
to suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold, theCouncil of Ministers on August 20, 1971, agreed to let
member states choose between fixed and free parities
vis-ii-vis  the dollar. In December 1971 the world's leading
industrial nations agreed on a major realignment of their
currencies, including a devaluation of the US dollar
against gold (from $35 to $38 an ounce). They decided to
widen from I to 2.25 per cent the margin above and below
pivotal" rates around which other currencies might
fluctuate against the dollar. Following their agreement in
March 1972 to relaunch monetary union, Community
countries, however, have since April 1972 maintained a
narrower margin - 2.5 per cent around the central rate - for
fluctuations between their currencies. They plan eventually
to eliminate these fluctuations.
Why economic and monetary union?
Although the Rome Treaty does not specifically .call for
economic and monetary union, it is a logical development
of the European Economic Community and has become an
important issue. The Commission has stressed for several
years .the need to harmonize member countries' monetary
and .economic policies and their joint responsibility for
mutual aid to help their partners overcome balance-of-
payments difficulties.
The main lines of this policy were set out in October 1962
in Chapter VIII (monetary policy) of the Commission
memorandum on a Community programme for the second
stage of the transition period and in the Commission
Initiative 1964" of September 1964.
In the 1962 memorandum the Commission affirmed that
the coordination of member states' policies "would be
incomplete, and therefore possibly ineffective, if no compar-
able action were taken in the field of monetary policy . It
recommended, among other things, the creation of
procedures for prior information and consultation, the
establishment of a common position for external monetary
relations, and the negotiation of an agreement laying down
the extent of mutual-aid obligations under the (Rome)
Treaty
" .
In February 1968 the Commission submitted to the
Council a memorandum on Community action in the
monetary field. It suggested that the Committee of Central
Bank Governors and the Monetary Committee should
examine:
. The possibility that member states should change their
currency parities only by common agreement.
. The elimination of day-to-day fluctuations around the
parities of member states' currencies , and the adoption of
identical ranges of fluctuation  vis-ii-vis  the currencies of
non-member countries. This would not only facilitate
commercial and financial relations within the Community,
but also allow member states to adopt a common position
should non-member countries adopt floating exchange
rates.
. The establishment within the Community, under Articles
108 (exchange rates) and 109 (mutual aid in case of balance- '
of-payments difficulties) of the Rome Treaty, of a multi-
lateral network of mutual credit facilities which could be
used by member countries in balance-of-paymentsdiffi-
culties.
. The definition of a European unit of account which
would be used in all fields of Community action requiring
a common monetary denominator.
The Commission also recommended that, while strength-
ening their internal monetary solidarity, member countries
should declare themselves ready to respect and uphold the
principles of the international monetary system asestab-
lished in international agreements concluded since the end
of the Second World War, and to contribute to the effective
operation of this system through concerted action.
Monetary jolts in 1968-69 proved the need for a joint
monetary policy. French devaluation and German revalua-
tion shook the common agricultural market; complicated
bridging regulations were introduced to keep it functioning.
The lack of a common monetary policy produced not only
internal disadvantages for the Community; the maintenance
of different national policies also meant that,  ViS-Clovis
non-member countries, the Community was unable to
defend effectively its independence and its common interest
particularly in international monetary matters.
A major reason for member states' present concern with
closer economic and monetary coordination is the potentially
harmful effects on the functioning of the Common Market
of member countries' attempts to solve in isolation any
balance-of-payments problems. Events since 1968 have
highlighted the possible disturbances to trade and economic
development which can arise when different countries
pursue independent monetary and fiscal policies. As a result
of the French Government's wage settlement following the
unrest in France in May 1968, the French balance-of-
payments deteriorated rapidly and led to heavy speculation
against the franc and in favour of the mark France and
Germany were determined to maintain existing parities
and used fiscal measures rather than exchange-rate changes
in order to remove their growing balance-of-payments
deficit and surplus, respectively. In November 1968 the
German Government introduced a 4 per cent tax on exports
and a 4 per cent subsidy on imports while the French
Government increased the rate of value-added tax and
introduced measures to subsidize exports.
These explicit as well as implicit taxes, subsidizing imports
in the one case and exports in the other, constituted barriers
to and distortions of trade between member countries.
. Hence-they tended to destroy the idea of a common market
which was the Community raison d'etre.  The 1968-
currency crisis gave a strong impetus to closer monetary
cooperation. On December 5, 1968, the Commission
submitted to the Council a memorandum on appropriate
Community policies to deal with the current .economic and
monetary problems. Accepting the conclusions of this
memorandum, the Council on December 12, 1968
, "
recog-nized the need for fuller alignment of economic policies in
the Community and for an examination of the scope for
intensifying monetary cooperation . On February 12, 1969
the Commission submitted a further memorandum clarify-
ing its position on these two points. Trade was further
dislocated when exchange rates were altered: in August
1969 the French franc was devalued by 11 per cent; 
September 1969 the mark was floated, and in October 1969
a new mark parity was fixed in terms of the dollar at 9 per
cent above its previous value.
Units of account
Under the common farm policy, common prices through-
out the Community are fixed in units of account, which
have been equivalent to the gold value of the United States
dollar. The system therefore comes under strain if some, but
not all, Community currencies change their parity in relation
to the dollar. In 1969, after the devaluation of the French
franc and the revaluation of the Deutschmark, measures
were taken to prevent German farmers from losing out.
(Without special measures, the German farmer would have
received the same dollar value, i.e. fewer marks, for his
produce, and French consumers would have faced immediate
price rises, as their food would have cost the same in
dollars, but more in francs.) France was then allowed to
maintain her former prices in French francs on condition
that she moved up to the common price levels within two
years. Farm imports into France from other Community
countries were granted rebates to bring them down to the
lower levels prevailing in France, while French farm exports
were taxed to bring them up to the higher price levels of the
rest of the Community. At the same time, Germany was
required to maintain the common prices, causing an
estimated annual loss of income to her farmers of about
DM 1 700 million. A temporary system of special subsidies
paid partly by the European Agricultural Fund and partly
by the German Government, was agreed.
The growing involvement of the national economies with
that of the Community - particularly as internal tariffs
were abolished - resulted in national instruments having less
effect in controlling economic activity and national economic
policy. This loss of economic freedom for the member
countries was not compensated for by an expansion of the
Community institutions' powers. Attempts to harmonize
economic policy at Community level frequently resulted
only in general recommendations, without concrete and
binding terms of reference.
Lack of an effective common economic and monetary
policy also hindered liberalization of capital movements
and the achievement of freedom of establishment for people
and firms. In other sectors, the lack of a common policy and
the maintenance of national legislation and practices
prevented balanced development in the Community.
Finally, it was widely felt that not only economic necessity
but also the politics of integration demanded a transition
to common decision-making in the whole field of economic
and monetary policy.
Dollar standard
Another reason for the Colllinunity s moves towards
monetary union was the growing European opposition to
the  de facto  dollar standard on which the non-Communist
world found itself. This situation was formalized in March
1968 by the creation of the two-tier gold system. Le. a fixed
gold-dollar ratio for settlements between central banks,
and a "free" market for other transactions in gold. One of
its important effects was to discourage a dollar devaluation
as a way of overcoming the persistent American balance-of
payments deficit ($9,800 million in 1970). Throughout the
1960s, the American balance-of-payments was in deficit and
the Community balance-of-payments in surplus, with the
result that European countries were forced, under existing
rules, to acquire increasingly large dollar balances. This
enabled the USA to pay for European products with credit
obtained from the Community. In particular, there was a
feeling in Europe that, by holding dollars short-term,
Europe as a whole had financed substantial American
purchases of European industry and had enabled the USA
to increase substantially its long-term direct investment in
Europe. Even in the Community foreign-exchange
markets, the dollar was used as the intervention currency to
stabilize exchange rates within the limits approved by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Of particular importance was the phenomenal growth of
the Eurodollar market (Le. dollars held outside the US);
this was largely the product of America s internal domestic
monetary policy of attempting to keep interest rates below
the level at which they would have been set by the forces of
the free market. The growth of this market meant that the
level of interest rates in all leading European countries,
including Britain, was determined by US monetary policy,
rather than by that of the European country concerned. If
US monetary and credit policy was tight, as it was for
example in 1969, and the US Government forbade a rise in
interest rates on bank deposits, then increased demand for
funds raised interest rates in Europe. In 1969 interest rates I
on the Eurodollar market rose to 13 per cent. In view of the
dollar s dominance and the dependence of other countries
monetary policies on that of the USA, the feeling grew
within the Community that European strategy should be
to develop a European currency. Along with the dollar
such a currency could be used both as a trading and as a
reserve currency in the international economy. It would not
necessarily be rigidly fixed in terms of the dollar.
The changed mood of the European central banks can be
traced largely to their increasing impatience with their
obligation to absorb large quantities of dollars into official
coffers, and to their inability to check the spectacular rise
of interest rates in the Eurodollar market under the impact
of huge American borrowings.
The unique position of the dollar as the main currency of
intervention in exchange markets made it necessary for the
central banks of the Community nations to purchase any
overflow of dollars in their markets to the extent necessary
to prevent the dollar s price from falling more than 0,75
per cent below IMP par values.
This obligation was limitless and unconditional under
existing arrangements. It was agreed to at a time when the
()llar~- 'sQlicquir,ed.,could always be converted, without
question, into gold at the US Treasury. The United States
persistent payments imbalance thus confronted the EEC
surplus countries with the choice of either financing US
deficits indefinitely - whether or not they agreed with
US policies - or appreciating their currencies in terms of the
dollar, as happened in May 1971 when the German mark
and the Dutch guilder were allowed to float.Such appreciation by countries acting in isolation raises
the costs of their producers in relation to the costs of their
competitors in all other countries which do not appreciate
their own currencies simultaneously. Even governments of
countries whose currencies are not overvalued are reluctant
to impose such a decision upon their farmers and industrial-
ists, and thus weaken their competitive position throughout
the world.
The American Government's decision on August 15, 1971,
to suspend the convertibility of dollars into gold, and the
devaluation of the dollar and the realignment of exchange
rates in December 1971, gave impetus to the move for a
reform of the world's monetary system. Following the
return to fixed exchange rates, though within wider margins
Community member states in March 1972 resumed their
advance to economic and monetary union.
The  Werner and other plans for  monetary
union
The first Barre Plan, a Commission memorandum
submitted to the Council in February 1969, called for
coordination of economic policies and monetary coopera-
tion within the Community. It said that the member states
should concert medium-term and short-term economic
policies, and set up Community machinery for monetary
cooperation: short-term and medium-term mechanisms for
mutual financial assistance for member countries with
balance of payments problems.
The second Barre Plan, submitted in December 1969
envisaged a three-stage process leading to economic and
monetary union by 1978, it again advocated that the six
member countries should gradually coordinate their
economic monetary policies, harmonize their taxes, narrow
exchange rate margins, and establish a Community capital
market and a mutual balance-of-payments assistance
mechanism.
The memorandum urged the six member states to act as
a unit in international monetary organizations and to
abstain from widening exchange rate margins between
their currencies. In the final stage, Community institutions
should have the powers necessary to ensure the smooth
functioning of the union. Member states should prepare to
introduce a Community system of central banks and a
European reserve fund. They should set unalterable
exchange rates between their own currencies, establish
free movement of capital, and eliminate fiscal frontiers.
The memorandum concluded: "The conditions governing
the introduction of a single European currency would then
be fu1filled.
In addition to the Commission s proposals, various
member states submitted plans. While there were differences
in emphasis, the general aims resembled those outlined
by the Commission. Germany, for example, called for
completely .stable and guaranteed exchange rates between
member states, but stressed that any move to a common
reserve fund must be preceded by a prolonged process of
economic and monetary coordination and harmonization.
Transition from one stage to another should not be auto~
matic, but dependent on a decision of the Council of
Ministers.
The  Werner Report's proposals
The Council's agreement of February 1971 on economic
and monetary union is based largely, though not exclusively,
on the proposals suggested by a group of experts headed by
Luxembourg Premier Pierre Werner. The interim and final
Werner Plans, in turn, were influenced by the Commission
Barre Plans and the various national proposals.
The Werner Report described the measures that the Six
would have to take to reach an economic and monetary
union, and the consequences that would result from its
achievement. It suggested that a first three-year stage
commence on January I, 1971.
These would be the main consequences of .such a union:
1. Community currencies would be freely convertible
among one another, and their parities  vis-a-vis  one
another irrevocably fixed. It would be preferable if they
could be replaced by a single Community currency.
2. The creation of liquidity in the entire Community, and
monetary and credit policies, would be centralized.
3. There would be a Community monetary policy  vis-a-vis
the rest of the world.
4. Member states would unify their policies on capital
markets.
5. The main components of budget policy - especially their
volume, and the size of the budget surplus or deficit and
the means of using the surplus or financing the deficit -
would be decided at Community level.
6. Regional and structural policies would no longer be
exclusively the domain of member states.
7. Trade unions and employers' organizations would be
systematically and continuously consulted at Com-
munity level.
As a result of these steps, the accomplishment of econo-
mic and monetary union would require the creation or the
transformation of a number of Community organs, to which
certain functions hitherto exercised by national authorities
would have to be transferred. The Werner Report said
that these transfers of responsibility would represent a
process of fundamental political significance, implying the
progressive development of political cooperation. Econo-
mic and monetary union would thus appear as an unavoid-
able stimulus to political union in the long run.
Two bodies
In the final stages (i.e. after 1980) two Community bodies
would be indispensable:
e a decision-taking centre for economic policy, which
could influence national budgets, decide to change the
parity of the single currency or the Community currencies
as a whole, and be responsible for the other sectors ofeconomic and social policies that had been transferred to a
COItlInunity-level.
This organ would be politically responsible to the
European Parliament, whose statute would have to be
modified- to increase its powers and .amend the way its
members were elected - to correspond with the Com-
munity' s extended role.
. A Community central-bank system, which would be
empowered to decide on internal monetary policy (liquidity,
interest rates, the granting of loans to the public and
private sectors). In the field of external monetary policy
this institution would have competence over exchange
markets and the management of the Community s monetary
reserves.
As the Community advanced towards monetary union
Community bodies would be created to take over or com-
plement the role of national bodies. This would ultimately
involve the amendments of the Rome Treaty. In aU sectors,
the measures that had to be taken would be interdependent
and would reinforce one another. In particular, the develop-
ment of monetary unification would have to be linked to
parallel progress in the field of the convergence, and then
the unification, of economic policies.
First stage, 1971-
The Werner Committee said that it did not seem possible
at that stage to lay down a precise and rigid timetable.
A certain flexibility was necessary to allow for adaptations
suggested by experience gained during the first stage.
The first stage would begin on January I , 1971, and last
for three years. One of the main aims to be attained during
the first stage would be the development of a swift, mutual
information system which would enable the joint drafting
of basic guideposts for economic and monetary policy.
The coordination of economic policies would have to be
based on at least three reviews in depth a year of the
economic situation in the Community, so that jointly
prepared guidelines could be laid down. During a first
meeting in the spring the authorities would review the past
year s economic policy and adapt it to any economic
changes. At a second, mid-year review, they would work
out the initial guidelines for the following year s policy and
decide on the policy to be followed during the remainder of
the current year.
During the third review, in the autumn, the authorities
would draw up mutually compatible budgets. The indicators
set in the budgets would serve as guidelines for the authori-
ties responsible for deciding on monetary policy and credit.
During this third meeting, the Council of Ministers would
draw up, on the basis of a Commission proposal, an annual
report on the Community s economic situation, indicating
in particular the short-term economic policy guideposts for
the following year. If a member state or the Commission
requested it ad hoc  discussions could recommend specific
actions.
During the first stage, the Council of Ministers would be '
the central decision-taking body for general economic
policy. It would set the medium-term goals and, within that
framework, decide on annual action programmes. The
competent Commission members and the Central-Bank
Governors would take part in these Council meetings. In
addition, the Council would have the power to convene
rapidly top-level representatives of governments and central
banks who would have enough responsibility to enable
decisions to be taken.
It would be for the Commission, within the framework
of the powers accorded it by the Community Treaties, to
submit to the Council any appropriate proposal so that the
Ministers could act on the matter in question. The various
Community Committees responsible for economic policy
would also playa greater role. The Committee of Central
Bank Governors would assume an increasingly important
part in determining the Community s internal and external
monetary policy.
Annual report
To ensure a better coordination of economic policies, the
annual report on the Community s economic situation
would be presented to the European Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee; and member governments
would present it to national parliaments so that they could
bear it in mind when discussing national draft budgets.
There would be a similar procedure for the medium-term
quantitative goals set at Community level. Before the
adoption of the major guidelines of a Community-level
economic policy, the Commission would consult trade-
union and employers' representatives , according to proce-
dures to be worked out.
Member states' budgetary policies would be carried out in
relation to Community goals. There would be a Community
review before governments took the final decision on their
draft budgets. National budget procedures would be
synchronized. Taxes would be harmonized as necessary, so
that tax frontiers in the Community could be gradually and
completely abolished.
Remaining obstacles to the freedom of capital movements, I
and especially exchange controls, would have to be rapidly
eliminated. The authorities would also have to coordinate
their policies on capital markets to remove inequalities in
the cost and conditions of access to credit.
To strengthen the solidarity of the Community s foreign-
reserves system, the Werner Committee called on the
Community s central banks to limit fluctuations between
member states' exchange rates. This should commence on
January I, 1971, on an experimental basis.
If the technique were successful, margins could be further
narrowed, and a  de facto  situation .could be changed into a
de jure  one. The authorities should study the creation and
operation, as well as the possible statute, of a European
fund for monetary cooperation; this institution would have
the task of supervising the transition to a Community
central-bank system, envisaged for the final phase.
The Werner Committee recommended that before the
end of 1973 an inter-governmental conference be held to
decide on the amendments that would have to be made to
the Rome Treaty to provide the necessary legal basis for the
change-over to an economic .and monetary union. A special
Council session would then work out an action programme
, for"th~follo.~~pgyears.
The Commission s proposals based on the
Werner Report
After studying the Werner Report, the Commission in
October 1970 forwarded to the Council a memorandum
expressing its views on the Werner Group s findings. This
memorandum was accompanied by a draft resolutioncalling for the implementation of the first stage of an
economic and monetary union, a proposal for a Council
decision on the strengthening of the coordination of
member states' short-term policies, and a draft Council
decision on increased cooperation between the central
banks of the Six.
The Commission memorandum shared the views expressed
in the Werner Report on the factors indispensable to the
existence of an economic and monetary union and on the
economic consequences implied by such a union.
It stated that the prospect opened up in The Hague by
the heads of state or government was of fundamental
political importance for the Community. The establishment
of economic and monetary union would also lead to
progress in the field of political unification, and bring other
benefits.
The Commission considered that the achievement of
economic union and monetary union would have to be
accompanied by the transfer to the Community of certain
powers previously exercised at national level. Such transfers
should be limited to what was necessary for the cohesion of
the union and for the effectiveness of Community action;
and policies decided on at Community level would have to
be subject to democratic control by the European Parlia-
ment. They would require regular consultations with both
management and labour.
The Werner Report found that two organs would be
indispensable to master economic and monetary policy
within the union: a decision-making centre for economic
policy and a Community system for the central banks. In
both cases, the report limited itself to general guidelines
and stressed the need for further, more detailed, study.
The Commission noted that each of the two cases raised a
different type of problem. On the one hand there were the
problems of administering the monetary side of the union
where, among other things, the institution of a Community
system for the central banks would be necessary.
On the other hand, there was the question of how the
economic and monetary policy of the union was to 
directed. In this respect, the Commission felt that the real
problem was the transfer of the necessary powers and
responsibilities to the Community institutions. It was
impossible at present to prejudge how powers would be
divided between the Community institutions, on the one
hand, and between these and the national authorities of the
member states, on the other. The Community institutions
must in any case be in a position to work effectively and on
a genuine democratic foundation.
Exchange rates
On the first stage of the transitional process, the Com-
mission agreed in general with the conclusions of the report.
It considered that the methods recommended for strength-
ening coordination of short-term economic policies represen-
ted the first step along the road towards the final objective
in this field. It attached special importance to the view
expressed in the report on the gradual reduction of the
range of fluctuation of currency-exchange rates between
member countries, and to the recommendations made on
the basis of the studies carried out by the Committee of
Central Bank Governors.
However, it stressed that structural and regional measures
should occupy a more important position in the description
of what was to happen in the first stage. These measures
should be put in hand without delay in the Community in
order to reduce the strains which might compromise the
eventual establishment of economic and monetary union.
The Commission did not believe it possible to make any
detailed observations on the short section of the report
dealing with the transition towards the final objective. For
this purpose it planned to set up a "European fund for
monetary cooperation" during the second stage and, if
certain conditions were fulfilled
, "
it may well be possible to
establish the fund in the course of the first stage . The
Commission felt that this important question deserved
closer examination, which should be undertaken without
delay on the basis of the report of the Committee of Central
Bank Governors.
The Commission proposed to the Council that by
December 31, 1970, it:
0 Resolve to establish by stages an economic and monetary
union in the Community, in which the Council would
express its political will to reach this goal during the
present decade, and would, for the period 1971-73, adopt
ana.ction programme as a first stage in the overall process
of achieving economic and monetary union.
. Decide to strengthen coordination of short-term econo-
mic policies; and bring about closer cooperation between
the central banks of the Community countries. :By these
decisions the Council would launch the action programme.
Agreement on a phased programme
The idea of an economic and monetary union was first"' poli~ieal authorities were asked to examine the idea in an
put forward in the memorandum of February 1968 from  ad hoc  committee, chaired by Luxembourg Prime Minister
the Commission to the Council of Ministers, drafted under and Finance Minister Pierre Werner. The committee
the supervision of Commission Vice-President Raymond presented an interim report in June 1970, and its final
Barre. At the request of the Council, the idea was further report to the Council in October 1970; and on the basis of
developed in a second Commission memorandum dated both Barre Reports and both Werner Reports, the Com-
February 1969. These became known as the two Barre mission on October 30, 1970, submitted to the Council the
Plans. After debate in .the Council of Ministers, the national formal proposal for economic and monetary union.In the process of submitting a radical idea to the scrutiny
of sovereign states, surprisingly little of the original plan
was lost. Indeed, its main components remained intact.
The transfer of certain precise powers to a Common
institution had been strongly recommended in both the
Barre and the Werner Reports. The decisive agreement of
February 1971 by the Council of Ministers did not in itself
achieve this transfer, but it went some way towards giving
a degree of common direction to one instrument, monetary
policy, by increasing the powers of the Committee of Central
Bank Governors; this body was not mentioned in the
Common Market Treaty and came into existence six years
after the Common Market began operating.
The other main economic instrument, fiscal policy,
remains largely in the hands of the member governments.
While no outright deletions were made from the original
tax harmonization proposals contained in the Barre Plans
the Werner Reports
, .
and the Commission s formal proposal
some specific recommendations were made more abstract
or less compelling. Thus, for example, the Council resolution
commits the member states to harmonizing the base and
scope of excise duties, but not to achieving uniform rates,
as the Commission had proposed. Or, the Council resolution
commits the Six to "further harmonization of the structure
of company taxation , rather than to the harmonization of
the base, as proposed by the Commission. The Six did
however, renew their commitment to achieving a uniform
turnover tax: system for the value-added tax (VAT), which
in Europe is a large source of tax revenue for the national
governments, and could eventually become one for the
Community itself. Beginning in 1975, up to the equivalent
of a I per cent VAT rate could accrue to the Community
coffers to help pay for Community policies.
Principles
In June 1970 the Council adopted the conclusions in the
Werner group s preliminary report. These were that:
. An economic and monetary union could be attained
during this decade, if the plan had the permanent political
support of the member governments;
. An economic and monetary union would mean that the
main economic policy decisions would be taken at Com-
munity level and therefore that the necessary powers should
be transferred from national to Community level. It could
result in the adoption of a single currency which would
guarantee the irreversibility of the undertaking;
.. 
Some of the measures that would be necessary would
involve the amendment of the Rome Treaty and the
preparation for this should be made from the first phase.
However, the present Treaty provisions allowed for
substantial progress;
. The first phase should begin on January I, 1971, and
could technically be completed within three years. This
phase would be used to make the Community instruments
more operational and to mark the beginnings of the
Community individuality within the international
monetary system;
Ell The first phase should not be considered as an objective
in itself; it should be associated with the complete process of
economic and monetary integration. It should therefore be
launched with the determination to arrive at the final goal;
. In the first phase consultation procedures should be
strengthened; the budgetary policies of the member states
should accord with Community objectives; some taxes
should be harmonized; monetary and credit policies
should be coordinated; and integration of financial markets
should be intensified;
e The Community should gradually adopt a common line
in its monetary relations with non-member countries and I
international organizations; in particular, it should not
make exchange rates between member countries more
flexible, even if this happened in the international exchange-
rate system.
Goals for  1980
By 1980 the Community would, according to the
Council resolution:
I. Constitute a zone where persons, goods, services and
capital would move freely - but without distorting
competition, or creating structural and regional imbal-
ances - and where economic undertakings could develop
their activities on a Community scale;
2. Form a single monetary entity within the international
monetary system, characterized by the total and
irreversible convertibility of currencies; the elimination
of fluctuation margins of exchange rates between the Six;
the irrevocable fixing of their parity relationships. These
steps would be essential for the creation of a single
currency, and they would involve a Community-level
organization of central banks;
3. Hold the powers and responsibilities in the economic and
monetary field that would enable its institutions to
ensure the administration of the economic union. To I
this end, the necessary economic policy decisions would
be taken at Community level and the necessary powers
would be attributed to Community institutions. The
distribution of powers and responsibilities among the
Community institutions, on the one hand, and the
member states, on the other, would be in line with the
need for cohesion of the union and the effectiveness of
Community action.
The Community institutions would need to exercise their
responsibilities in economic and monetary matters effectively
and quickly. The Community policies carried out in the
framework of the economic and monetary union would be
subject to the control of the European Parliament. The
Community organization of central banks would assist, in
the framework of its own responsibilities, in achieving the
objectives of stability and growth in the Community.
These three principles would apply to:
. The internal monetary and credit policies of the union;
e Monetary policy  vis-a-vis  the rest of the world;
e Policy on a .unified capital market and capital movements
to. and from npn~meIl1ber countries;
e Budgetary and taxatIOn policies, as related to the policy
for stability and growth. (For budgetary policy, the margins
within which essential elements of all public budgets must
be situated, especially the variation in their volumes, the
size of the balances, and the methods of financing deficits
and using surpluses, would be determined at Community
level).Medium-term monetary aid
The Council decided on February 9, 1971, to set up
machinery for medium-term financial aid. It provides that
when a member state is faced with balance-of-payments
difficulties or serious threats of such difficulties, it may
resort to the machinery for mutual Community aid.
The granting of such credit is .decided by the Council,
acting by a qualified majority. Member states may be called
upon to contribute up to the following ceilings:
millions 
e The gradual enlargement of tax exemptions for Germany 600 
individuals crossing intra-Community frontiers. Belgium/Luxembourg 200 
Before the end of the first phase, the Council will examine France 600 
the studies undertaken, and the Commission s proposals Italy 400 
on the harmonization of VAT and excise duties. " , . .-Netherlands 200 
Total . 2.000 100
To encourage the unrestricted movement of capital, the
Council, at the Commission s proposal, plans, in the first The system applies for four years as from January 1, 1972, phase, to: with
, in principle, automatic renewal every five years
thereafter. These arrangements complement the short-term
monetary support system which came into force in February
1970. The maximum quotas are identical under both
systems.
. Structural and regional action needed to contribl.~te to
the balanced development of the Community.
As progress was made in moving closer to the final
objective, Community instruments would be created
whenever they seemed necessary to replace or complement
the action of national instruments. All actions would be
interdependent; in particular, the development of monetary
unification would be backed by parallel progress in the
convergence, and then the unification, of economic policies.
First phase
The Council in February 1971 agreed on a series of
actions to be carried out during a first phase covering the
three years 1971-73.
The Council fixes, at the Commission s proposal
provisions to strengthen the coordination of short-term
economic policies, and in particular to achieve a greater
degree of obligatory prior consultation. Coordination of
short-term economic policies is related to programmes for
medium-term economic policy.
After the Commission has consulted employers and
unions, in the framework of the Economic and Social
Committee or by other procedures, the Council lays down
at the Commission s proposal, the broad lines of economic
policy at Community level and quantitative guidelines for
the main elements of national budgets.
To facilitate coordination of economic policies, the
Council, at the Commission s proposal and after consulting
the Community Committees concerned, takes the measures
needed to harmonize gradually the instruments of economic
policy and especially the timetable for national budgetary
procedures.
To speed up the effective freedom of movement of persons
goods, services and capital, and the interpenetration of
national economies, the Council, at the Commission
proposal, enacts measures on:
. Community rules laying down a uniform basis of
assessment of value-added tax (VAT);
. Harmonization of the field of application, the basis of
assessment and the terms of levying of excise duties
especially those that considerably influence trade;
41) Harmonization of taxes that directly influence capital
movements within the Community, expecially taxes on
interest from fixed-income stocks and shares and on
dividends;
. Further harmonization of the structure of corporation
taxes;
. Adopt a directive authorizing the elimination of discrimi-
nation when stocks and shares are issued by someone who
resides in another member country;
. Establish a procedure for the gradual coordination of
member states' policies on financial markets.
. Take regional and structural action to reduce pressures
which could compromise the achievement, on schedule, of
the economic and monetary union. At the Commission
proposal, the Council will enact the measures necessary to
solve urgent regional problems. These will be based on the
Third Programme for Medium-term Economic Policy, and
the Council will give the Community the appropriate
means within the framework of the existing Treaties.
Short-term monetary aid
The Community member states' five central banks
(Luxembourg and Belgium share the same central bank) on
February 9, 1970, made $2 000 million available as short-
term monetary aid to member countries running temporary
balance-of-payments deficits.
Drawings from a first $1 000 million tranche are
immediate and automatic upon request. From this first
tranche, each member s central bank may draw up to the
amount of its quota or pledge: Germany and France
$300 million each; Italy, $200 million; the Netherlands and
the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, $100 million
each. The borrowing must be repaid in three months; and,
after using the funds, the borrower must enter into economic
consultations with the other member countries.
Borrowing from the second $1 000 million tranche is not
automatic but requires prior economic consultation.
However, a country can borrow up to the full $1 000 million.
The loan from the second tranche, repayable within three
months (but renewable), can be used either concurrently
with the funds from the first $1 000 million, or consecutively.
(A member country could, for example, first borrow
$300 million, pay it back in three months, and borrow
000 million for another three months; or borrow a full
300 million at one time.
The plan operates through the Bank for International
Settlements in Basle.Credits granted under the medium-term aid system are
for two to five years. They are financed by the participating
states in proportion to their uncommitted contributions.
Normally, interest rates are about halfway between
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and market rates.
A decision to grant aid lays down the amount and terms
of the credit, and the economic-policy commitments to be
undertaken by the recipient member state, particularly in
relation to the quantitative guidelines for medium-term
economic policy.
A member state claiming present or foreseeable balance-
of-payments difficulties andjor persistent fall in its
reserveS is exempted from subscribing to the scheme, but
its economy remains under the Monetary Committee
scrutiny. If the Commission or a member state believes that
the grounds for such exemption no longer exist, the Council
may ask the member state concerned to take part in the
scheme, and may lay down the terms for this.
The Council has agreed on the conditions and procedures
for anticipated repayment of debts, total or partial, if the
reasons for the initial appeal for aid have disappeared.
Member countries in balance-of-payments difficulties
have to consult their partners before seeking medium-term
loans outside the Community. The Monetary Committee
then looks into the possibility of implementing the Com-
munity aid system, and examines the need for cooperation
with the IMF.
Credit is mobilized either by credit transfers inside the
system, by accelerated repayments by debtor countries, by
refinancing outside the system, or a combination of all
three. Refinancing might be arranged through a joint
Community approach to international organizations, like
the IMF.
currencies. The Committee of Central Bank Governors
must report twice a year to the Council and the Commission
on the functioning of the concerted action of the central
banks on the exchange markets, and on the advisability of
adopting new measures in this field.
Coordination of short-term economic
policies
Member states coordinate their monetary and their credit
policies within the terms of the Council's guidelines for
general economic policy. The EEC central banks coordinate
within the Committee of Governors, their monetary and
credit policies; draw up general guidelines to be followed by
each bank, particularly on bank liquidity trends, loan
terms, and interest-rate levels; and work out the means for
applying this procedure.
The Council meets three times each year to review the
Community economy. On the basis of a Commission report
and, where appropriate, draft decisions, directives or
recommendations proposed by the Commission, the
Council enacts guidelines for the short-term economic
policy to be followed by the Community and by each
member state so as to ensure balanced growth.
At the first meeting, the governments review the previous
year s economic policy. At a second examination they draw
up compatible guidelines for the main features of the
preliminary budgets for the following year. Quantitative
guidelines for these draft budgets are then finally adopted.
These guidelines take into account proposed increases or
decreases in expenditure, and deal with the methods of
financing deficits or using surpluses.
At the third meeting, the Council, on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, I
adopts an annual report on the Community s economy.
This enables member governments to :fix the economic
guidelines that each member state should follow in the
subsequent year.
After its adoption, each member government submits
this annual report to its national parliament for debate.
In October 1971, the Council for the first time carried out
this section of the plan, when it adopted an annual report
on guidelines for 1972.
Coordination of monetary and credit
policies
To strengthen the coordination of monetary and credit
policies, the Council agreed that:
It Prior and obligatory consultations should be intensified
within the Monetary Committee and the Committee of
Governors of Central Banks;
It The central banks, within the limits of their competences
and within the framework of their own responsibilities,
should coordinate their policies within the Committee of  Beyond the  first  stage
Central . Ban~ Governors, on the bas~s of the general By June 30, 1972, the Monetary Committee and the
econOmIC pohcy as set out by the CouncIl; Committee of Central Bank Governors must jointly report
It The Monetary Committee and the Committee of Central to the Council and Commission on the organization
Bank Governors should continue to cooperate on the functions and statutes of a European Monetary Cooperation
harmonization of monetary policy instruments. Fund. The Fund could be integrated later in the Community
The Council decided that the Community should organization of central banks. Depending on experience
gradually adopt a common stand in monetary relations acquired in reducing margins and harmonizing economic
with non-member countries and international organizations; policies, this Fund should be established during the first
in particular, it should not make exchange relations between phase.
member countries more flexible. To ensure the necessary parallelism between the econo-
From the beginning of the first phase, and on an experi.. 'mic  and monetary measures, the monetary provisions
mental basis, the central banks should keep the fluctuations (narrowini of margins, and the creation of a European
of rates between Community currencies within narrower Monetary Cooperation Fund) and the medium-term
margins than those resulting from the application of the financial assistance mechanism are valid for five years as
margins in force for the US dollar. from the beginning of the first phase. Should agreement be
Depending on the results in the harmonization of econo- reached on the transition to the second phase, these provi-
mic policies, new measures could be taken to move from a sions will remain in force.
de facto  to a  de jure  system of intervention in Community By May 1, 1973, the Commission should submit:. a progress report on the first phase taking into account
the parallelism needed between coordination of economic
policies and progress in the monetary field in the Com-
munity;
. a report, drawn up in collaboration with the advisory
committees concerned, on the distribution between the
institutions of the Community and the member states of
powers and responsibilities required in carrying out short-
term economic policy, monetary and credit policies, and
budgetary policy, if the economic and monetary union is
to work effectively.
:Before the end of the first three-year phase, the Six will
lay down, at the Commission s proposal, the measureS
leading, after the transition to the second phase, to the
complete achievement of economic and monetary union.
These will be based on the existing provisions of the Treaty,
or on articles 235 or 236 of the Treaty. (These permit the
member states to take unanimous action to achieve Com-
munity goals where this is not allowed for in the Rome
Treaty, or to amend the Treaty).
Third medium-term economic policy
programme (1971-75)
The member states on February 9, 1971, also adopted
the Community s third medium-term economic policy
programme, for 1971-75. This programme, based on a
draft submitted by the Commission, contained for the
first time compatible statistical guidelines for 1971-75 and
defined the overall economic policies and major structural
projects which would have to be carried out at both national
and Community levels.
The programme was the Community s third and by far
the most ambitious; it was the first to .set quantified guide-
lines for four key economic indicators - movement of prices
level of unemployment, rates of growth (gross national
product), and the balance-of-payments - and to ask the
member states to conform to them.
The plan put special emphasis on prices, saying Germany
and France had a vital role to play in ensuring that their
prices and economies did not get as far out of line as they
did in the late 1960s, forcing both countries to change their
currency parities in opposite directions. Comparing the
increases forecast in the various countries' national plans
for the next five years, the Commission said "the projections
made by the member states seem to verge on incompatibi-
lity" .
The Commission sought to bring the inflation rates more
into line and set targets agreed on by all the members of the
Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee and the
Commission (which was .represented on the Committee).
In some cases, this meant a change from the national plans
as originally drafted.
Over 1971- , the Community should seek an average
annual price increase growth of 2.5 to 3 per cent, if measured
on the global index of all items included in the gross national
product, or between 2.3 and 2'8 per cent if measured on
the consumer price index.
Unemployment targets set for 1971-75 ranged from 0,8
per cent for Germany to 3 per cent for Italy. The Commis-
sion said its unemployment figures should not be taken as
an objective, nor as a minimum. They simply reflected the
employment levels that would be considered satisfactory.
For growth of member states' gross national products
(the total output of goods and services), the Commission
called for an average of 5 to 5.5 per cent a year, excluding
price increases. France was expected to grow a little more
than average and Germany a little less. For Belgium and
Luxembourg, the guidelines in the Community programme
have ranges somewhat lower than those aimed at in their
national plans.
Looking to their balances of payments, the member
states worked out forecasts for two measures:
. the so-called external balance, which covers not only
payments for goods and services, but also other items, such
as immigrants' remittances, which are not pure capital
transactions;
. the current .account balance, which covers day-to-day
payments for trade in goods and services.
The external balance was forecast to average one per cent
of the Community s gross national products over the five
years, while the surplus on current account was put at 0-3
per cent of GNP. Germany was expected to have the
biggest surplus - 1.7 per cent in its external balance, while
France s would be exactly the Community average. On
current account, most members were expected to come
close to breaking even; Italy and the Netherlands were the
exceptions.
Taking the first steps
In March 1972, after almost a year s halt, the Community
resumed its advance to economic and monetary union. The
Six - and the four prospective member states - resolved to:
. Strengthen the prior consultation procedure agreed in
July 1969, and ensure that member governments consult
their partners before deviating from agreed economic
policies;
. Set up a top-level Council working party to coordinate
short-term economic and financial policies within guidelines
laid down by the Council;
. Narrow fluctuations in the exchange rate between Com-
munity currencies - on an experimental basis - from the
present  maximum of 4-5 to 2.25 per cent, and gradually
eliminate them later;
II Promote stability, growth and full employment in the
Community, on the basis of a Commission draft directive;
fIj Use Community funds to step up development of back-
ward regions;
9 Act jointly to counteract sudden large inflows of capital
from outside the Community;. Give priority to Commission proposals on tax harmoniza-
tion and the freeing of capital movements.
Ministers reached the agreement in principle on March 7
1972, and formally adopted it at a Council session on March
20- , after the applicant countries had accepted the plan
in principle.
Britain, however, made three points:
. The 2.25 per cent band should not be narrowed if, on the
day the measure Were introduced, Community currencies
should be even closer together;
. Intervention within the Community and the wider inter-
national band should be concerted;
. Community central banks should settle their accounts in
proportion to the debtor country s reserves.
Britain attached importance to the regional aspects of the
agreement and said that regional aid should be given to
declining industries.
EEC  monetary zone
The agreement is seen as a vital move in consolidating
the Community and paving the way for further integration.
The measures are regarded as a first step in the formation of
a distinct European monetary zone, which could help to
stabilize international monetary relations. As they are
carried out they will have direct implications for the Com-
munity s tax systems, agriculture, capital markets, and
regional development; they will have political consequences,
in that control of economic and monetary policy will
gradually be transferred from the national to the Community
level. By acknowledging the need for Community action 
help backward regions, member states have accepted further
financial solidarity, which should also strengthen political
cohesion.
The basic decisions on creating an economic and monetary
union had been taken in February and March 1971. Apart
from coordination of budgetary policies, however, the plan
remained virtually stillborn. The Six were about to take the
first concrete step in June 1971, narrowing exchange-rate
margins between their currencies; then the world monetary
crisis led Germany and the Netherlands on May 10 to float
their currencies. President Nixon s economic package of
August 15 - especially the decision to suspend the con-
vertibility of the dollar into gold - led to further monetary
disarray, with member states adopting various policies:
floating rates, wider margins, and the "two-tier" system for
capital and trade transactions.
Mean parities
In the world currency realignment of December 1971, the
central feature was an 8'57 per cent devaluation of the dollar
in terms of gold. This restored mean or "central" (though
not fixed) parities for exchange rates; but at the same time
the official margin of fluctuation against the dollar was
widened to 2.25 per cent on either side of the central rate.
Thus the maximum fluctuation in terms of the dollar was
twice 2.25 per cent - 4'50 per cent.
The paradox of the new situation, however, was that the
theoretical possible fluctuation for Community currencies
against each other now stood at twice 4,50 per cent - 9 per
cent- a level hardly compatible with the notion of stable
trading conditions in a single market without trade barriers.
It was even less compatible with the notion of free trade in
farm produce, based on prices fixed in terms of gold. More-
over, with an inconvertible dollar still the currency ofinter-
ventions in foreign-exchange markets, central-bank inter-
vention to stop its currency going through the ceiling would
mean a further accumulation of dollars which might later
have to be unloaded at a loss. In this situation, with central
banks unwilling to acquire dollars, the likelihood of wide
fluctuations between Community countries' currencies them-
selves was substantially greater than before the crisis.
Member states felt that their economies were linked too
closely to the fortunes of the dollar and that they still risked
being submerged by a massive inflow of dollars. Com-
munity central banks could be forced to buy up the dollars,
to maintain their parity, or let the dollar rate depreciate
even further, thereby making Community goods less com-
petitive with US exports on world markets.
Member governments therefore had a powerful incentive
to agree swiftly on a set of new economic and monetary
:measures. The measures agreed on in March 1972 were
based to a large extent on the Commission s proposals, and
the Commission played a major role in enabling the Six to
make concessions to each other and so reach a common
stand. It was France in particular that urged a s:maller
currency fluctuation band, largely because currency fluctua-
tions disturb the operation of the common agricultural
policy (see page 6).
Farm prices
Whenever Community parities have changed their rela-
tionship to one another by more than 2.5 per cent the Com-
munity has, under arrangements agreed by the Six, intro-
duced border taxes and rebates to neutralize the effect of
these fluctuations on food prices. For example, the revalua-
tion of the mark meant that, though German farmers
received the same number of units of account, this was
equivalent to fewer marks. Imports from partner states were
therefore taxed at the German border to bring their price
up to the previous level in terms of marks.
Germany, backed by the Netherlands, argued that as their
currencies were the strongest in the Six, their central banks
might well have to bear the main burden in keeping weaker
currencies within the narrower band. They therefore sought
parallel moves to coordinate member states' economic
policies. Here, France accepted Germany s views on the
creation of a high-level steering committee and obligatory
prior consultation. It is understood, however, that in
emergencies governments may act first and seek approval
from their partners afterwards.
Italy, supported by Belgium, called for parallel Com-
munity action in bolstering up poorer areas of the Com-
munity. By committing themselves to closer coordination of
monetary and economic policies, member governments
could have less room for manoeuvre in national action and
at the same time may need to increase outlays to promote
balanced development. Britain, Norway and Ireland are
, '
underst~odJQ,abare,the Italian view; of the Ten, these four
countries have the most serious regional problems and there-
fore stand to gain most from any allocation of Community
funds. Under discussion are the annual provision of 50
million units of account from the European Agricultural
Fund to encourage firms to set up factories in declining
agricultural regions, and the creation of a regional develop-
ment fund, which would each year pump a further 50munits into distressed regions, in the form of capital grants
and interest subsidies on loans.
Capital flows
To help to stabilize the Community s own exchange
system and to neutralize the effects on internal Iiqnidity of
sudden large movements of short-term capital from outside,
the Council adopted the Commission s draft directive of
June 23, 1971. This includes measures to: regulate deposits
in the money market and the interest paid to non-residents;
control loans which Community residents contract in non-
Community countries; regulate the net external liabilities of
credit institutions; and fix compulsory reserve margins
particularly for non-residents' assets. Here, Germany had
been reluctant to limit her freedom of action.
Both Germany and France were unwilling to commit
themselves at this stage on the proposed establishment of a
European monetary cooperation fund. Such an institution
presupposes far-reaching integration of monetary policies
and would represent a major advance to a Community
central bank system and a pooling of reserves. The Six there-
fore repeated their 1971 decision that experts submit a
report on such a body by June 30, 1972.
As essential complementary measures, the Council also
agreed to tackle urgently the Commission s proposals to
ease the circulation of capital within the Community and
establish a European capital market, and to harmonize
taxation. The Council's resolution does not, however, refer
to the Commission s related proposal for intensified social
measures to employ, train and retrain workers.
On taxation, the main proposals involve; a uniform basis
for assessing value-added tax; harmonized taxes on fixed-
interest stocks, shares and dividends (these directly influence
capital movements in the Community); further harmoniza-
tion of the corporation-tax structure; and larger tax exemp-
tions for tourists travelling between Community countries.
To facilitate capital movements, the Commission seeks a
coordination of national policies on .capital markets and
abolition of discrimination when a :firm in one member
country issues stocks and shares in another .country.
Most ofthe March 1972 decisions resemble those taken in
1971 on the first stage (1971-73) of economic and monetary
union; the Six then agreed on closer coordination of, and
prior consultation on, financial, budgetary and economic
policies; tax harmonization; and easier capital movements.
The major exception is the setting up of the steering com-
mittee. The Six had, however, planned to narrow on June 15,
1971 the margin of fluctuation between Community cur-
rencies from 0'75 to 0.60 per cent either side of dollar parity.
(Under IMF rules the margin either side WaS I per cent, but
under an GECD European Payments Union agreement
European countries in practice set their intervention points
at about 0,75 per cent either side of par).
and 0,75 per cent down) was put around the fixed rate with
the dollar so that currencies could move slightly to absorb
exchange market pressures. After the world monetary up-
heavals of recent years, however, this band was considered
too narrow, and in December 1971 the ten richest nations
decided to widen it to 4.5 per cent (2-25 per cent above and
2.25 per cent below) the central rate.
Whenever a country s currency is weak  vis-a-vis  the
dollar, that country s bank sells dollars to buy its own
currency, in order to bring its currency nearer the parity
rate. When the country s currency is strong, its central bank
has to sell its currency and buy dollars, to reach parity. In
recent years, the dollar has been weak and most Community
countries' currencies have been strong. Community central
banks have therefore been obliged to mop up large quantities
of dollars - an arrangement which has discriminated in
favour of the dollar. Until the US had suspended the con-
vertibility of the dollar on August 15, 1971, central banks
could theoretically swap their dollars for gold, though they
did not always do, partly because this would have further
weakened the dollar.
Normally the currencies float according to market pres-
sures inside the band with .little intervention, but in a crisis
very large amounts are bought and sold. Up to now the
European central banks have not in general intervened in
other Community currencies against each other in this
system, because their exchange relationships have derived
from their respective dollar relationships.
Disadvantages for Europe
A further feature discriminating in favour of the dollar was
that the exchange rate between two European currencies -
the "cross rate" - could vary by twice as much as the rate of
each against the dollar. If one day the mark stood at the
dollar ceiling and the lire at the dollar floor and the next day
the positions were reversed, the actual change on the market
between the two would be 9 per cent -assuming the present
4.5 per cent band.
Thus Community currencies had been able to fluctuate
by 2.25 per cent either side of the normal rate for the dollar,
e. by 4.50 per cent against the dollar but by 9 per cent
against one another over a period.
In practice such a rapid shift does not.happen, but over a
period of months it is possible. Therefore businessmen prefer
to make long-term contracts in dollars because its relation to
any other currency cannot change by more than 4,5 per cent
barring revaluation or devaluation. The wide deviation
which had been possible between European currencies could
upset the Community's common market in farm products:
without stable monetary relations, a complicated system of
compensation must be operated at the border between
member countries.
Therefore the Community s central banks have decided
that from April 24, 1972 member states' currencies must
Maintaining narrower margins 
. , ...,
nptQjy'~rge at any given moment by more than 2.25 per cent
The fluctuation margin is a device which allows currencies fromeach6ther.Thus over a period they will not be able to
to enjoy some of the flexibility of a floating exchange rate fluctuate against each other by more than 4,50 per cent (by
with the security of a fixed rate. Before May 1971, for two currencies reversing their position in the 2.25 per cent
example, each currency was pegged by a specific rate to the band). This new nartow band has become known as the
dollar and thus to all other currencies. The rate WaS change- "snake" inside the "tunnel" of the global 4,5 per cent band.
able only by devaluation, revaluation or a temporary float. As long as market forces maintain the European currencies
But a fluctuation margin of 1.5 per cent (0'75 per cent up within 2.25 per cent of each other inside the tunnel, therewill be no problem. The snake could be as thin as market
forces permit. If, for example, all the currencies remained at
the same rate against the dollar, the snake would simply be a
single line on a chart. Ultimately the Community aiJ,1J.S
gradually to slim the permitted band to this point, and thus
create a COmmon European currency - at least for central-
bank transactions.
But when the relationship between two Community
currencies threatens to diverge beyond 2.25 per cent, prob-
lems will arise. Central banks of the two currencies will have
to intervene in each other s money to ease the pressure. If
for example, the mark were at the upper limit and the lire at
the lower, either the Banca d'Italia would borrow marks
from. the Bundesbank and use them to buy lire and support
its sinking currency, or the  Bundesbank would buy lire and
sell marks. Which bank should bear the brunt of the inter-
vention - that with the strong money or that with the weak-
will be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Relation to the dollar
In principle, the Europeans would like the band, which
can be narrower than 2.25 per cent but never wider, to mOVe
up and down in the tunnel according to market forces. When
the Community currencies are very strong, the snake s top
will touch the ceiling and the banks with the strongest
currencies will buy dollars with their money as before to
force their currencies down. Similarly, if the Community
currencies become very weak and the snake hits the bottom
the banks with the weakest currencies will sell dollars and
buy their own currency. The Commission has proposed a
common fund to spread out the burden for the high or low
currencies which must intervene in dollars, and the govern-
ments have asked their central banks to report on the
proposal by June 30, 1972.
As the Europeans intervene in each other s currency they
will inevitably run up debts. But they do not want to
establish a precedent for holding each other s currencies
e. leaving debts unpaid too long, since if a currency is
consistently strong and its bank keeps lending money to
support others, it could become a sort of reServe currency
with the headaches which that brings. Therefore it was
decided to balance all debts once a month.
The bankers also frown on allowing debtors to make
repayments in whatever form they wish, since the temptation
to unload unwanted dollars in that way might be too great.
Thus each country will pay its debts by a formula corres-
ponding to the composition of its reserves. This way the
reserve positions of the European countries should tend to
align themselves.
Composition of reserves, March 1972
(percentages)
France
Netherlands
Belgium
Italy
Germany
Gold
Special
Drawing
Rights
Currencies
(Dollars in 
brackets)
43 (41)
11 (5)
21 (18)
45 (36)
67 (63)
77 (mostly $)
One short-term advantage of narrower margins is that
Community currencies will not be more than 2.25 per cent
apart at any moment, and cannot fluctuate against each
other by more than 4,5 per cent over time, instead of by
9 percent, as formerly. This eliminates the discrimina-
tory treatment favouring the dollar, increases stability in
making Community payments and, on a political level
, .
can
be the start of a Community monetary system.
But it remains to be seen whether the new system will be
able to withstand intense speculative pressure. If a member
state changes the value of its currency through revaluation or
devaluation (the Council's agreement does not exclude this),
the system can theoretically absorb the change, since the
fixed rate itself and not the margin is shifted. But if such a
change is preceded by the usual period of hesitation, specula-
tive movements could upset the mechanism used to preserve
the narrow band. Member states have, however, adopted
measures to control sudden inflows of short-term capital,
which are intended to provide protection in such an event.
Another major problem could arise should one currency
enter a chronic debtor situation, thereby draining its
reserves. A number of devices exist to extend medium- and
long-term credit; these include the Community s medium-
and short-term financial aid systems, for each of which
member states have made $2 billion available. Recourse to
these, however, is not the same as correcting the situation.
To achieve this, the chief weapon would be the measures
adopted on economic coordination. Member states' ability
to keep their economies in line is seen by many experts as
the key to ensuring the success of the whole ambitious plan
for economic and monetary union.